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Abstract 
This article uses Christopher Southgate’s work and engagement with other scholars on the topic 
of evolutionary theodicy as a case study in the dialogue of science and Christian theology. A 
typology is outlined of ways in which the voices of science and the Christian tradition may be 
related in a science-theology dialogue, and examples of each position on the typology are given 
from the literature on evolution and natural evil. The main focus is on Southgate’s evolutionary 
theodicy and the alternative proposal by Neil Messer. By bringing these two accounts into 
dialogue, some key methodological issues are brought into focus, enabling some conclusions to 
be drawn about the range and limits of fruitful methodological possibilities for dialogues 
between science and Christian theology. 
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Introduction 
Christopher Southgate has been one of the leading voices in the science-theology dialogue for 
many years, making major contributions to various specific debates in the field. The breadth and 
quality of his scholarship, together with his theological acumen, are such that his contributions to 
substantive debates are also object lessons in methodology. From watching Southgate in action 
engaging with a particular problem, much can be learned about how theology should – and how 
it should not – engage with the natural sciences and the questions they raise. 
One issue with which Southgate is particularly associated is the problem of theodicy in the light 
of evolution. In this essay, I propose to use his work and his engagement with other scholars on 
this topic as a case study in the dialogue of science and Christian theology. The problem of 
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evolution and theodicy is not only important and interesting in its own right (one might indeed 
say “fascinating”, to use one of Southgate’s own favourite adjectives). It can also teach us much 
about the kinds of thing Christian theology should – and should not – be ready to learn from 
science. 
Framing the problem 
In this as in many areas of theological enquiry, how you ask the questions has a significant 
bearing on the kinds of answer you are likely to get, so it is worth noticing some aspects of the 
way Southgate frames the problem. He approaches it explicitly as a Christian theologian, 
distancing himself from the kind of philosophical theodicy intended to “provide logical 
demonstrations of the goodness of God in the face of evil” (Southgate 2017, 149). His question is 
rather how Christian traditions of faith and practice should speak of the God whom they confess 
and worship. For such traditions, he thinks, it is the ambiguity of the natural world which poses 
particular questions. We find it easy to marvel at the rich variety of intricate and exquisitely 
adapted living beings and systems we see around us, yet nature is also full of pain, suffering, 
death and destruction. Moreover, we know from evolutionary theory that these “disvalues” are 
intrinsic to the process which generates life in all its richness and wonder. The theological 
problem for Christians is that God is “deeply implicated” in this ambiguity, “through having 
created processes to which disvalues were intrinsic.” (Southgate 2014a, 785)  
It is noteworthy that Southgate has explicitly made the impact of evolution on non-human 
animals visible as a theological problem. In particular, he has tended to single out two effects of 
the evolutionary process as disvalues requiring a theological response: the pain and suffering 
associated with the struggle for life (citing behavioural and neurobiological evidence that animal 
suffering is real suffering, e.g. Southgate 2008, 3-4), and species extinctions, which represent the 
complete loss of particular ways of being a creature in the world (ibid., 9). 
Though Southgate has sometimes used the language of good and evil to describe the ambiguity 
of nature, he has generally preferred the terms “value” and “disvalue,” perhaps to avoid begging 
questions about which features of the evolutionary process should be evaluated as good or evil. 
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In some of his more recent writing he has shifted to the language of “beauty” and “ugliness,” a 
choice of words perhaps not unconnected with his shift of focus away from theodicy towards the 
theme of divine glory as a way of coming to theological terms with the ambiguity of the world 
(Southgate 2014a).  
Setting up the dialogue: a typology and some caveats 
Evolutionary theodicy, so framed, is the site of an encounter between science and theology. 
More particularly, we can think of it (in a schematic and over-simplified way) as an encounter 
between two “voices”: the voice of a Christian tradition of faith and practice, with its roots in the 
Scriptures of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament, and the voice of science, in this case 
evolutionary biology. In which case, how much weight should be given to each voice in shaping 
the dialogue and addressing the questions we are seeking to answer, and what kind of 
contribution can each properly make? 
Broadly speaking, five types of answer can be distinguished:i 
1) Only the voice of science contributes, the contribution of the Christian tradition being 
denied or dismissed; 
2) Both voices contribute, but the voice of science plays the dominant role in shaping the 
dialogue and addressing the questions. The claims of the Christian tradition must be 
adjusted where necessary to fit an account whose shape and content are determined by 
the scientific voice. 
3) Both voices contribute, and neither one plays a dominant role in shaping the dialogue or 
answering the questions. Both contribute their own distinctive perspectives, which are 
related to one another by means of what Hans Frei (1992, 38 et passim) called “ad hoc 
correlations”. 
4) Both voices contribute, but the voice of the Christian tradition plays the dominant role in 
shaping the encounter and addressing the questions.  
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5) Only the voice of the Christian tradition contributes, the contribution of science being 
denied or dismissed. 
In the remainder of this paper, I shall use this typology to structure an exploration of the various 
positions in the debate about evolutionary theodicy, with a particular focus on Southgate’s own 
thinking and some critical responses to it. Before beginning that exploration, however, I must 
enter some caveats about my typology and its use. 
First, as I have already acknowledged, it is a rather schematic and over-simplified way of 
representing the engagement between science and theology: it is obvious that neither “Christian 
tradition” nor “evolutionary biology” represents a single, unified voice. Nevertheless, this 
simplified representation can serve a useful heuristic purpose, provided we keep its limitations in 
mind. 
Second, the voices of “Christian tradition” and “science” are not the only ones in the 
conversation: philosophy, in particular, may play various different roles in discussions about the 
problem of evil. For simplicity’s sake the typology and the following discussion are structured 
around the relationship of the two voices labelled “Christian tradition” and “science,” but it will 
be important to remain alert to the ways in which other voices may influence the encounter 
between these two. 
Third, the issue is not only how much weight to give to the voices of Christian tradition and 
science, but what kind of contribution each can – and cannot – properly make to our 
understanding. The typology is structured according to the “How much?” question. However, 
once we begin to examine the various positions in the debate, questions about what each voice 
can and cannot contribute to our understanding of God and God’s ways with the world will also 
come into view. 
Fourth, I am not using the typology to classify authors, but only particular arguments, moves or 
approaches. Some authors might operate wholly or predominantly according to one of my types 
(the late Arthur Peacocke, for example, seemed to regard his theological project in general in the 
This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: [Messer, Neil (2018) Evolution and 
theodicy: how (not) to do science and theology. Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, 53 (3).], 
which has been published in final form at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-
9744/issues. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms 
and Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
 
 
way I have described as type 2: e.g. Peacocke 2000). The work of others may be more complex 
and varied, operating in different modes on different occasions. Southgate has indeed argued that 
different areas of the science-theology dialogue may require different types of engagement 
(Southgate 2008b), and that the nature of the evolutionary theodicy discussion calls for what I 
would describe as a type 3 approach (Southgate 2017, 156). 
Finally, my use of the typology is not purely descriptive or neutral. As will become clear in the 
discussion, I regard some ways of approaching the science-theology dialogue as clearly 
preferable to others. I certainly aim to give a fair account of the various possibilities, which I 
hope will prove informative and clarifying; but my account will also be a normative proposal 
about how a science-theology dialogue like this one ought to be set up. 
Closing down the dialogue: types 1 and 5 
The first type of engagement rules out any contribution from the Christian tradition; of the two 
voices we are considering, only science is reckoned to have anything to say. This position is 
reflected in the scientific atheist argument that evolutionary suffering is one indication that this is 
not the kind of cosmos we should expect if it were the creation of God. As Richard Dawkins puts 
it: “The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, 
no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind, pitiless indifference.” (Dawkins 
1996: 155) In short, the phenomenon of evolutionary suffering is consistent with a materialist 
view of the universe in which theological responses have no place. 
The fifth type is almost a mirror image of the first: of our two voices, only the Christian tradition 
is thought to have anything to say. This could be because the scientific voice is acknowledged as 
valid in its own sphere but thought to have nothing to say about questions of faith and value, as 
in the late Stephen Jay Gould’s view that science and religion are “non-overlapping magisteria” 
or “NOMA” (Gould 2002). Alternatively, the validity of the scientific voice could be denied, as 
by young-earth creationism. One reason given by creationists for rejecting evolution is that the 
Christian doctrine of the atonement as understood, for example, in light of Romans 5:12-21, 
presupposes a literal reading of Genesis 1-3, including the six-day creation of a “very good” 
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world, followed by the first humans’ fall into sin. In that case there is no need to see suffering or 
destruction as part of the process by which life is generated; instead, natural as well as moral evil 
can be accounted for as a consequence of the fall (e.g. Moore 2006; see Dembski 2009, Chap. 5 
for further discussion of this position). 
These examples could be critiqued in their own right. In any event, if we are exploring 
possibilities for dialogue between theology and natural science, types 1 and 5 in general seem 
unpromising – to put it mildly – because both amount to refusals of dialogue rather than ways of 
conducting it. 
Revising Christian God-talk: type 2 
The second type of approach allows the voices of science and the Christian tradition to 
contribute to our understanding of God and God’s ways with the world, but privileges the former 
in determining the shape and content of the encounter. In the field of evolutionary theodicy, 
scientifically-informed knowledge of evolutionary suffering and destruction problematizes the 
Christian tradition’s confession of God as sovereign and good. A type 2 response might revise 
Christian claims of God’s power, goodness or both. This is the path that Wesley Wildman invites 
Christians and other theists to follow, abandoning belief in God as a “determinate entity” in 
favour of a “ground-of-being theism” whose God is “the ontological spring of matter and value” 
but “not good in a humanly recognizable way, nor personal in character” (Wildman 2007, 293).ii 
Wildman offers an acute diagnosis of the difficulties facing “determinate-entity theism” (and 
process theism, which he also judges inadequate) in this area. However, his proposed solution 
comes at a high cost to Christian faith and practice. He observes that “Christianity has always 
had an idiosyncratic approach to suffering because of its Christological lens” (Wildman 2007, 
293). I agree, but would add that Christians, formed by the awkward and idiosyncratic story of 
Christ’s incarnation, life, death and resurrection, are therefore committed to a life of faith in a 
sovereign God whose goodness and love are made known to humanity in the person of Jesus 
Christ – whatever the mysteries and conundrums this life of faith requires them to wrestle with. 
For this reason, I concur with Southgate in including Wildman’s ground-of-being approach 
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among the “roads not [to be] taken” (Southgate 2008a, Chap. 2) in addressing the problem of 
evolutionary theodicy. More generally, I have suggested elsewhere another reason to be wary of 
type 2 science-theology dialogues. It is widely agreed that the natural sciences should be 
methodologically naturalistic; therefore if we expect them to answer putatively non-naturalistic 
questions about God and God’s ways with the world, we risk failing to respect the integrity and 
proper limits of scientific methods, as well as distorting or pre-judging the outcome of the 
enquiry (Messer 2017a, 33-34).iii 
Southgate’s compound theodicy: type 3 
According to Southgate, in the field of evolution and theodicy, “robust science encounters 
theology at its most tentative … There is thus good reason for taking the main lines of the 
scientific conclusions with the utmost seriousness” (Southgate 1017, 156). Therefore, while he 
aims “to give full weight to the Christian doctrinal tradition,” he also wishes “to learn from 
science about the way things really are” (Southgate 2015, 247). Such remarks locate his 
evolutionary theodicy firmly in my type 3, where it represents one of the most influential and 
carefully worked-out contributions to the field. It is set out most fully in The Groaning of 
Creation (Southgate 2008a), and defended and further developed in a series of more recent 
publications (including Southgate 2011, 2014a, b, 2015, 2017).  
Southgate describes his approach as a “compound theodicy” composed of various elements (see 
Southgate 2008a, 15-17 for a summary). At its heart is the “only way” argument: creation is 
under a constraint, such that creaturely life in all its “beauty, diversity and sophistication” 
(2008a, 48) can only come into being though an evolutionary process involving natural selection. 
Even the sovereign God of Christian confession could not bring creaturely life into being in any 
other way. Crucially, this suggests that God willed the evolutionary process that entails suffering 
and destruction, because this must have represented the best balance between the “good of 
realizing creaturely values and the concomitant pain” (2008a, 48). 
Even if this is true at the level of species or the system as a whole, however, the evolutionary 
process has countless individual victims: creatures whose life is mostly suffering with little 
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opportunity for the realisation of their creaturely being. The “only way” argument must therefore 
be supplemented by others. One is that God suffers “in, with and under” the suffering of 
creatures; the death and resurrection of Christ are to be seen as the moment where this divine co-
suffering is most intensely focused, and God inaugurates the transformation of creation. This 
transformation will be fulfilled in an eschatological future (“pelican heaven”) in which all the 
individual victims of evolution will be compensated by the ultimate fulfilment of their creaturely 
form of life. Finally, Southgate claims a special calling for human beings to act as “co-
redeemers,” co-operating with God for “the healing of the evolutionary process” (all quotations 
in this paragraph from Southgate 2008a, 16). 
Southgate recognizes that his account is vulnerable to various criticisms. One is that it relies on a 
strong and unavoidably speculative claim about the kinds of thing that might or might not be 
possible even for an all-powerful God. Southgate acknowledges that his “only-way” argument is 
speculative in this way, but considers the speculation reasonable in light of what we know about 
the physical cosmos and biological evolution (2017, 157). Another criticism is directed at the 
idea of eschatological compensation for suffering: D. Z. Phillips, for example, has argued that it 
seems an inadequate response to horrendous evils (Phillips 2005, 81-90, 247-55). Southgate and 
Robinson (2007, 82-84) agree that a theodicy which depended solely eschatological 
compensation would be inadequate, not least because it would make a kind of Manichaean 
separation between creation and redemption. However, they argue that compensation does have a 
proper place in theodicy, alongside arguments showing how the goodness of God is compatible 
with a creation that includes the possibility or necessity of suffering. 
A more general point is that Southgate’s approach has the basic argumentative structure of many 
theodicies: we can affirm the goodness of a God who has created a world with evils in it, because 
the goods of this world could not be realized without the evils, and the goods are great enough to 
be worth the price.iv This line of thought has been criticized by a range of philosophers and 
theologians (e.g. Phillips 2005; Swinton 2007), who argue among other things that by explaining 
and justifying the presence of evil in the world, mainstream theodicies can themselves become 
sources of evil. Rather than explaining or justifying evil, according to Swinton, it is the business 
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of Christians to resist it by means of distinctive practices such as lament, forgiveness, 
thoughtfulness and hospitality (Swinton 2007: Chaps. 4-8). Southgate acknowledges the 
seriousness of such “anti-theodicy” arguments, but maintains that theodicies such as his, done by 
people of faith seeking to understand God’s ways with the world, can escape the force of the 
anti-theodicists’ criticism (Southgate 2015: 247-48). 
An alternative proposal: type 4 
In an earlier essay, partly motivated by critiques like these, I advocated an alternative approach 
to the problem of evolution and natural evil (Messer 2008).v The framing of the problem, the 
choice of starting point and the way of addressing tensions between theological affirmations and 
scientific data locate my proposal within the fourth type of science-theology encounter. My 
approach begins with reflection on biblical texts such as Genesis 1 and Isaiah 11:6-9, 
acknowledging the dissonance between the picture of God’s good purposes for creation 
suggested by these texts and the scarcity, struggle and violence at the heart of the world 
disclosed to us by evolutionary biology. Rather than concluding that God willed such 
evolutionary disvalues, I conclude that this state of affairs (in the words of Karl Barth) “does not 
correspond with the true and original creative will of God” (Barth 1961, 353). The fact that 
suffering and destruction are intrinsic to the evolutionary process in this world should be 
recognized as an aspect of evil, opposed to God’s good purposes. If we try to explain how or 
why this should be, we will inevitably find ourselves facing a mystery. However, informed by 
authors like Phillips and Swinton, I maintain that focusing too much on questions of explanation 
can distort and misdirect our enquiry. Our principal focus should rather be on what God has done 
and promised to overcome evil in and through Jesus Christ, and on how we are to respond to 
what God has done and promised. 
This approach has a few difficulties of its own to negotiate. One is that the evil is so closely 
tangled up with the good: in this world, the latter is inconceivable without the former, and this 
has been the case for the entire lifetime of the world accessible to historical or scientific 
investigation. Yet that is not so different from many ways in which we experience the world as 
an inextricable mixture of good and evil. This is one way to read the “fall” narrative of Genesis 
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3: not as a history of our origins, but a mirror reflecting back to us the world as we actually 
inhabit it; good and beautiful, but also tragically flawed and broken. The hope and good news in 
this perspective lie in the promise that it will not always be like this, because of God’s 
reconciling and redeeming work in Christ. 
Another potential difficulty has to do with how we conceptualize evil. At first glance, my 
account might seem dualistic, representing evil as an independent cosmic force opposed to God. 
This would be a great mistake, which Christian theologians have for the most part taken pains to 
avoid. My approach draws on Karl Barth’s creative re-working, elsewhere in the Dogmatics, of a 
long-standing Christian effort to avoid cosmic dualism by conceptualizing evil as a privation of 
good (privatio boni). Barth uses the term “nothingness” (das Nichtige) to speak of evil (Barth 
1960b, 289-368).vi By “nothingness,” he does not mean “nothing.” Rather, he means what God 
rejected, or did not will, when God willed to create all things and declared them “very good” 
(Genesis 1:31). As such, nothingness has a strange, paradoxical, negative kind of existence: it is 
the chaos, disorder or annihilation which threatens God’s creation, to which God is implacably 
opposed, which has been decisively overcome through the work of Christ. My proposal is that 
some features of the evolutionary process reflect, not God’s good creative purpose, but rather 
nothingness: the disorder and annihilation threatening the goodness of creation. 
Types 3 and 4 in debate: what should theology (not) learn from evolutionary biology? 
Southgate has paid me the compliment of extended critiques in most of his publications on 
theodicy since The Groaning of Creation (e.g. Southgate 2011, 2014b, 2015, 2017). There are 
important areas of common ground between us: for example, as he puts it, we both aim “to give 
full weight to the Christian doctrinal tradition” (2015, 247), and we agree that suffering and 
destruction are intrinsic to the evolutionary process underlying the whole history of life on Earth. 
For all that we agree on, however, Southgate lays various charges against me: for example, that I 
have misread Barth, that despite my disavowals I am some kind of cosmic dualist, and that in an 
attempt to affirm God’s goodness I deny or limit God’s sovereignty (2011, 378-84). 
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This is not the place for a detailed rebuttal of these charges (though needless to say, I deny 
them). However, one of Southgate’s complaints goes to the heart of the difference between us. 
As such, exploring it a little further may help clarify what is at issue between the types of 
science-theology dialogue that our approaches exemplify. 
According to Southgate, my approach “does grave harm to the conversation between theology 
and the sciences” (2011, 384). This is because I do not take seriously enough the way 
evolutionary values and disvalues are inextricably intertwined, and therefore I avoid rather than 
facing the central problem, that God is implicated in the suffering and destruction associated 
with the evolutionary process. My approach “leads [me] away from a willingness to learn from 
the sciences about the way things really are” (2015, 247), and “runs the risk of making theology 
appear too defensive, too bent on mysterification, to be part of an authentic conversation” (2011, 
384). If Southgate is right about this, it would seem to raise serious questions about the viability 
of my fourth type of science-theology dialogue; so if I am to defend that type, a response to 
Southgate’s critique is needed.  
A good deal hangs on that phrase “the way things really are,” and in one sense, Southgate is 
right. I am unwilling to learn from the natural sciences about the way things really are 
(theologically speaking), because I deny that they are competent to tell us about what Christian 
confession recognises as the most fundamental reality of the world. This is not to deny for a 
moment that the natural sciences can give us genuine knowledge of the world.vii But we do need 
to be as clear as possible what kinds of question natural science can and cannot answer about 
“the way things are.” Or, to put it another way, we need to be as clear as possible about what 
theology should be willing to learn from science, and what it should not. 
In Christian confession, the most fundamental thing to say about the world we inhabit – the way 
things most really are – is that it is God’s creation. “Creation” is a theological, not a scientific, 
category, and if we want to know what is meant by describing the world as “creation,” we need 
to look first to the Scriptures and the Christian tradition’s reflection on them. One of the key 
claims we shall find if we look there is creation’s goodness. Part of what is meant, in Christian 
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tradition, by describing the world as “creation” is that “all that God has made” should be 
recognised as “very good” (cf. Genesis 1:31).viii 
Now, we learn from evolutionary biology that for the entire history of life on earth, the struggle 
for existence, with all the suffering and destruction that it entails, has been intrinsic to the 
generation of biological life in all its varied, complex and wonderful forms; but the suffering and 
destruction of the struggle for existence appear far from good. This is not just a sentimental or 
intuitive judgment: in neither the created world depicted as “very good” in Genesis 1, nor the 
coming peaceable kingdom envisioned by Isaiah (11:6-9), do we see the predation, violence or 
competition for scarce resources that are intrinsic to the struggle for existence in the world we 
know.ix There are at least prima facie reasons, then, to think that suffering and destruction 
associated with the evolutionary struggle for existence are not what the Christian tradition means 
by calling the creation “very good.” There is a dissonance to be resolved.  
In an attempt to resolve this dissonance Southgate in effect reconsiders what might be meant by 
the “goodness” of God’s purposes. Knowing that suffering and destruction are intrinsic to the 
evolutionary process, he concludes that God must have willed such an evolutionary process as 
the means by which creaturely life on earth came to be. Perhaps this was because creation was 
under a constraint, so even an all-powerful God could not create complex life any other way 
(Southgate 2011, 381); in any event, the God who willed the end must have willed the means. 
This evolutionary insight then forms an element of the hermeneutical lens through which 
Southgate reads the Scriptures, so that he attaches less weight to the Isaianic vision of the 
peaceable kingdom as an expression of God’s good purposes, and instead argues that texts like 
Job 38:39-41 and Psalm 104 support the view that those purposes include predation (ibid., 384). 
In short, evolutionary findings can tell us something about how God acts in the world, and 
therefore how we should understand the goodness of God. 
I am wary of making this move, because I doubt the capacity of finite and sinful human creatures 
to learn about the goodness of the transcendent God by reasoning from our investigations of the 
natural world. In doing so, we risk inappropriately projecting our experience of the world onto 
God. Moreover, as I suggested earlier in relation to type 2 approaches, if we expect science to 
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teach us about God’s good purposes for creation, we may do a disservice to science as well as 
theology.  
This is not to say that science has nothing to contribute to the Christian tradition’s reflection on 
God’s ways with the world. That claim would amount to a type 5 position – a refusal of dialogue 
– which I have already rejected. In which case, what can science contribute? My answer in 
general terms, borrowing a phrase of Barth’s, is that a science such as evolutionary biology can 
serve as “an interesting commentary on a text which must first be known and read for itself if the 
commentary is to be intelligible and useful” (Barth 1960a, 122). Evolution can tell us plenty 
about the “phenomena” (Barth’s word again) of the world we live in. But if we wish to 
understand what it means for this world to be the good creation of a loving and sovereign God, 
destined for ultimate fulfilment in God’s good purposes, we shall need to read evolutionary 
biology through the lens of the Christian tradition, not vice versa.  
Attempting to do so yields something like the following picture. Christian tradition speaks of a 
world which is God’s good creation, destined for ultimate fulfilment in God’s good purposes, but 
is diverted from that destiny and distorted by the presence of evil, so that “[its] purpose can be 
achieved only by its redirection from within by the creator himself” (Gunton 1998, 11). In the 
present age, the only one to which historical or scientific investigation gives us access, it has 
always been thus: the world we inhabit is a tragic mix of goodness and brokenness, and this is 
the world that has the evolutionary struggle for existence woven deeply into its fabric. Predation, 
violence and destruction are inevitable aspects of that struggle, and the biblical texts cited by 
Southgate, such as Job 38 and Psalm 104, which speak of God giving the predators their food, 
may indeed give the impression that God sanctions evolutionary violence and destruction. But as 
Barth argues, the depiction of the peace of creation in Genesis 1 is a sign that these things “[do] 
not correspond to the true and original creative will of God and … therefore [stand] under a 
caveat”, and texts like Isaiah 11:6-9 promise a good future “when there will be no more question 
of the struggle for existence” (Barth 1961, 353). In this world, neither we nor God’s other 
creatures can live without violence and struggle, and texts such as Job 38 and Psalm 104 are 
perhaps best read as expressions of God’s patience and grace, making it possible for creatures to 
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live even in this broken world. But Christians should recognize this state of affairs as standing, in 
Barth’s phrase, under a divine caveat. We should hope and pray for a good future when it will no 
longer be the case. We should also witness to that future hope by doing what is possible for us, 
with God’s help, to renounce violence and participate in the healing of the world’s brokenness.x  
This approach to evolutionary evil offers less by way of explanation than some theodicies 
purport to. However, I have already suggested that attempting to explain evil has its dangers. As 
that which is opposed to God’s goodness and grace, there is something fundamentally irrational 
and inexplicable about the presence of evil in the world (cf. Barth 1960b, 353-54). By attempting 
to explain it, we risk rationalizing it and giving it a place in the world (so to say) to which it is 
not entitled. As I suggested earlier, our focus should rather be on what God does to overcome 
evil and how we should respond. 
As noted above, Southgate maintains that my approach is an evasion of the really hard questions 
in evolutionary theodicy, “too bent on mysterification … to be part of an authentic conversation” 
(2011, 384). Yet he himself acknowledges that the problem of evolutionary theodicy is not in the 
final analysis soluble, and has a “necessary element of mystery” about it (2008, 16). So when he 
chides me for being “too bent on mysterification,” presumably he simply means that I appeal too 
quickly to mystery. However, I would regard my approach, not as an evasion, but a re-framing of 
questions that are often problematically framed. In return, I would ask whether he is more ready 
than he should be to accept a problematic framing of the issue, which lends itself all too easily to 
the sceptical conclusions of Dawkins and others. 
Conclusion: improving the quality of our disagreements 
My main purpose in this paper has been to show how Southgate’s work brings into sharper focus 
the various possibilities for setting up a science-theology dialogue on a question such as this. 
Taking my cue from Paul DeHart (2006, Chap. 5),xi I propose some conclusions that can be 
drawn in terms of the typology outlined earlier. 
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I have already suggested that types 1 and 5 should be ruled out, if only because they are 
rejections of dialogue rather than ways of framing it. More tentatively, I consider type 2 an 
unpromising way to approach science-theology dialogues. As I suggested earlier, not only may 
the theological costs of such approaches be unacceptably high, but some of them risk distorting 
the scientific voice in the dialogue, by expecting it to answer questions it is not equipped to 
answer. However, I emphasize that this is a more tentative conclusion than my rejection of types 
1 and 5: it would be open to someone who wished to advocate a type 2 approach to show that I 
am wrong to reject it.  
In principle, I would suggest, types 3 and 4 can both be legitimate ways of framing science-
theology dialogues, because both of these types allow space for theology to operate according to 
its proper sources and methods. However, each of these types has its own characteristic danger 
or temptation. For type 3, the danger is to drift towards type 2, ceding more control than it ought 
over the framing of the issues and the ways in which they are approached to the scientific voice 
in the dialogue. Some of my criticisms of Southgate suggest that this is a danger he has not 
always avoided. For type 4, the characteristic danger is to drift towards type 5, separating voices 
of science and the Christian tradition to the extent that the scientific voice can no longer make 
any contribution to theological understanding, and dialogue ceases. Some of Southgate’s 
criticisms of my position, in effect, draw attention to this kind of danger, which I acknowledge 
needs to be taken seriously.  
It may be, then, that within the whole science and theology field, types 3 and 4 form what 
DeHart (2006, 217) calls a “mutually stabilizing pair”: each needs the critique and correction of 
the other to draw it back from its characteristic danger. This is not to say that a dialogue set up in 
one or other of these ways will always get things right. As I have already made clear, I still 
believe Southgate’s response to the problem of evolutionary theodicy to be mistaken in some 
important respects, and reject the central criticisms he makes of mine. But at least by defining 
our differences in these terms, it becomes possible to understand them more clearly, and so, as 
the saying goes (cf. Harris 2016) to improve the quality of our disagreements. 
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To conclude, Southgate’s major contribution to the discussion of evolutionary theodicy is 
twofold: he has given one of the fullest and most carefully worked-out presentations of an 
approach that – though I remain unpersuaded by it – has a good deal to be said for it; and by 
defending his view so vigorously in dialogue with a range of critics, he has brought into sharper 
and clearer focus some key issues about how such difficult questions in science and theology 
should be explored. 
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i I originally developed this typology some years ago as a heuristic device to help structure a 
dialogue between evolutionary biology and theological ethics (Messer 2007, 49-62). Since then I 
have used it (with some variations in its formulation) in other dialogues between theology and 
the biosciences, particularly but not exclusively in relation to ethical questions (Messer 2017a, 
Chap. 2; 2017b). I believe that its use could be extended to other areas of science-theology 
dialogue, but that development must await a future occasion. The influence of Hans Frei (1992) 
on my typology will be evident, though mine was developed in a different context for a different 
purpose and is not simply equivalent to Frei’s. For a relatively recent discussion of Frei’s 
typology, see DeHart (2006, Chap. 5). 
ii Wildman maintains that ground-of-being theism has ancient roots in a range of religious 
traditions, but has become obscured in modern affluent societies by a “personalistic focus in the 
doctrine of God” that he regards as “excessive” (2007, 269; see also 280-81). 
iii This is a characteristic risk of type 2 approaches, but it may not affect all of them. Whether or 
not Wildman’s ground-of-being approach would be subject to this criticism would require further 
work to determine. 
iv For a typology of the various ways in which goods may be said to justify harms in theodicy, 
see Southgate and Robinson (2007). They suggest that Southgate’s theodicy includes elements of 
what they term a “developmental” good-harm analysis, in which the good is realized through a 
process that includes the possibility or even necessity of harm, and a “constitutive” good-harm 
analysis in which the good is inherently inseparable from the harm (2007, 88-89). 
v The central move in my account – to identify evolutionary disvalues with evil, opposed to 
God’s good purposes – has something in common with the approaches taken by Creegan (2013) 
and Deane-Drummond (2018), though they are both critical of the way I work this out with 
reference to Karl Barth’s account of evil as “nothingness.” 
vi The remainder of this paragraph is taken with modifications from Messer (2009a, 149). 
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vii Like most participants in science-theology dialogues, I take as read some form of critical 
realist view of science, though I do not have space to discuss or defend that view here.  
viii In various places Southgate discusses the meaning of “very good” in Gen. 1:31, emphasizing 
particularly its eschatological reference: “very good” does not mean complete, but destined for 
eschatological perfection (Southgate 2008, 15-16; 2011, 386-7). It is perfectly possible to agree 
with this without undermining my basic point, since my account does not propose a temporal 
sequence of perfect creation followed by historical fall. 
ix There are, on the other hand, texts such as Job 38:39-41 and Psalm 104, which speak of God 
giving predators their food. This might seem to call into question the point I am making. 
However, as I show in the following paragraphs, there are different ways to read these texts and 
understand their significance for a theological view of predation and evolutionary suffering. 
These differences map onto Southgate’s and my different approaches to evolutionary theodicy. 
x This last point, concerning human responsibilities in the face of evolutionary suffering, is 
another area of some common ground between Southgate and me (see Southgate 2008, Chaps. 6, 
7). On the matter of our human calling and responsibility we agree on some things but not 
everything: for example, I am wary of describing humans as created co-creators and co-
redeemers, as Southgate does; and in terms of practical responsibilities, he rejects vegetarianism, 
which I would advocate (Messer 2009b). Our disagreements about practical ethics are perhaps 
not unrelated to our differences about theodicy. 
xi In the chapter cited, DeHart is offering a reading of Hans Frei’s typology, which was – as 
explained earlier (above, note 1) – an inspiration for mine. 
